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Bluffing and betting behavior in a simplified poker game

Published on Jan 1, 2009in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 1.79
· DOI :10.1002/bdm.658
Darryl A. Seale17
Estimated H-index: 17
(UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas),
Steven E. Phelan14
Estimated H-index: 14
(UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)
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Abstract
A pure-strategy, simplified poker (PSP) game is proposed, where two players draw from a small and discrete number of hands. Equilibrium strategies of the game are described and an experiment is conducted where 120 subjects played the PSP against a computer, which was programmed to play either the equilibrium solution or a fictitious play (FP) learning algorithm designed to take advantage of poor play. The results show that players did not adopt the cutoff-type strategies predicted by the equilibrium solution; rather they made considerable “errors” by: Betting when they should have checked, checking when they should have bet, and calling when they should have folded. There is no evidence that aggregate performance improved over time in either condition although considerable individual differences were observed among subjects. Behavioral learning theory (BLT) cannot easily explain these individual differences and cognitive learning theory (CLT) is introduced to explain the apparent anomalies. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  • References (22)
  • Citations (11)
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References22
Newest
Published on Sep 1, 2008in Journal of Economic Education 0.65
David H. Reiley10
Estimated H-index: 10
(UA: University of Arizona),
Michael B. Urbancic3
Estimated H-index: 3
(University of California, Berkeley),
Mark Walker17
Estimated H-index: 17
(UA: University of Arizona)
The authors present a simplified, "stripped-down" version of poker as an instructional classroom game. Although Stripped-Down Poker is extremely simple, it nevertheless provides an excellent illustration of a number of topics: signaling, bluffing, mixed strategies, the value of information, and Bayes's Rule. The authors begin with a description of Stripped-Down Poker: how to play it, what makes it an interesting classroom game, and how to teach its solution to students. They describe how signali...
Published on Sep 1, 2006in International Game Theory Review 0.61
Darryl A. Seale17
Estimated H-index: 17
(UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas),
John E. Burnett3
Estimated H-index: 3
(UAH: University of Alabama in Huntsville)
A computational procedure, Simulated Fictitious Play (SFP), is introduced to approximate equilibrium solutions for n-person, non-cooperative games with large strategy spaces. A variant of the iterative solution process fictitious play (FP), SFP is first demonstrated on several small n-person games with known solutions. In each case, SFP solutions are compared to those obtained through analytical methods. Sensitivity analyses are presented that examine the effects of iterations (repetitions of th...
Published on Mar 1, 2003in Memory & Cognition 1.95
Richard F. West43
Estimated H-index: 43
(JMU: James Madison University),
Keith E. Stanovich82
Estimated H-index: 82
(U of T: University of Toronto)
In three experiments involving over 1,500 university students (n=1,557) and two different probabilistic choice tasks, we found that the utility-maximizing strategy of choosing the most probable alternative was not the majority response. In a story problem version of a probabilistic choice task in which participants chose from among five different strategies, the maximizing response and the probabilitymatching response were each selected by a similar number of students (roughly 35% of the sample ...
Published on Jul 1, 2002in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 1.79
David R. Shanks57
Estimated H-index: 57
(UCL: University College London),
Richard J. Tunney18
Estimated H-index: 18
(UCL: University College London),
John D. McCarthy18
Estimated H-index: 18
(UCL: University College London)
In a typical probability learning task participants are presented with a repeated choice between two response alternatives, one of which has a higher payoff probability than the other. Rational choice theory requires that participants should eventually allocate all their responses to the high-payoff alternative, but previous research has found that people fail to maximize their payoffs. Instead, it is commonly observed that people match their response probabilities to the payoff probabilities. W...
Published on Dec 1, 2000in International Game Theory Review 0.61
B.B. van der Genugten7
Estimated H-index: 7
(Tilburg University)
Fictitious play can be seen as a numerical iteration procedure for determining the value of a game and corresponding optimal strategies. Although convergence is slow, it needs only a modest computer storage. Therefore it seems to be a good way for analysing large games. In this paper we introduce a weakened form of fictitious play, where players at each stage do not have to make the best choice against the total of past choices of the other player but only an increasingly better one. Theoretical...
Published on Oct 1, 2000in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17.19
Keith E. Stanovich82
Estimated H-index: 82
(U of T: University of Toronto),
Richard F. West43
Estimated H-index: 43
(JMU: James Madison University)
Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These p...
Published on Jul 1, 2000in The Accounting Review 4.56
Geoffrey B. Sprinkle16
Estimated H-index: 16
(IU: Indiana University Bloomington)
This paper reports the results of an experiment that examines how incentive‐based compensation contracts compare to flat‐wage compensation contracts in motivating individual learning and performance. I use a multiperiod cognitive task where the accounting system generates information (feedback) that has both a contracting role and a belief‐revision role. The results suggest that incentives enhance performance and the rate of improvement in performance by increasing both: (1) the amount of time p...
Published on Feb 1, 2000in Journal of Economic Surveys 2.76
Nir Vulkan14
Estimated H-index: 14
(UCL: University College London)
The experimental phenomenon known as ‘probability matching’ is often offered as evidence in support of adaptive learning models and against the idea that people maximise their expected utility. Recent interest in dynamic-based equilibrium theories means the term re-appears in Economics. However, there seems to be conflicting views on what is actually meant by the term and about the validity of the data. The purpose of this paper is therefore threefold: First, to introduce today’s readers to what...
Published on Jan 1, 1998in The American Economic Review 4.10
Ido Erev40
Estimated H-index: 40
,
Alvin E. Roth76
Estimated H-index: 76
The authors examine learning in all experiments they could locate involving one hundred periods or more of games with a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies, and in a new experiment. They study both the ex post ('best fit') descriptive power of learning models, and their ex ante predictive power, by simulating each experiment using parameters estimated from the other experiments. Even a one-parameter reinforcement learning model robustly outperforms the equilibrium predictions. Predictive powe...
Amnon Rapoport48
Estimated H-index: 48
(UA: University of Arizona),
Ido Erev40
Estimated H-index: 40
(Technion – Israel Institute of Technology)
+ 1 AuthorsDavid E. Olson1
Estimated H-index: 1
(UA: University of Arizona)
Abstract Thirty pairs of subjects participated in three different two-person zerosum Poker games in extensive form with imperfect and asymmetric information. The results provide no support for the (unique) mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players on either the individual or the aggregate level. Compared to this solution, the informed players do not bluff as often as they should, and the uninformed players call too often. Comparison of the present study with previous studies o...
Cited By11
Newest
Published on Jul 1, 2018in Cognitive Science 2.25
Seth Frey6
Estimated H-index: 6
(IU: Indiana University),
Dominic K. Albino3
Estimated H-index: 3
(UConn: University of Connecticut),
Paul L. Williams7
Estimated H-index: 7
(IU: Indiana University)
Published on Jun 1, 2017in Computers in Education
Maria Kordaki11
Estimated H-index: 11
(University of the Aegean),
Anthi Gousiou1
Estimated H-index: 1
(University of the Aegean)
This paper presents a 10-year review study that focuses on the investigation of the use of Digital Card Games (DCGs) as learning tools in education. Specific search terms keyed into 10 large scientific electronic databases identified 50 papers referring to the use of non-commercial DCGs in education during the last decade (20032013). The findings revealed that the DCGs reported in the reviewed papers: (a) were used for the learning of diverse subject disciplines across all educational levels and...
Published on Dec 7, 2016in Games
Marco Alberto Javarone1
Estimated H-index: 1
We introduce a model for studying the evolutionary dynamics of Poker. Notably, despite its wide diffusion and the raised scientific interest around it, Poker still represents an open challenge. Recent attempts for uncovering its real nature, based on statistical physics, showed that Poker in some conditions can be considered as a skill game. In addition, preliminary investigations reported a neat difference between tournaments and ‘cash game’ challenges, i.e., between the two main configurations...
Published on Jan 1, 2016in arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory
Seth Frey6
Estimated H-index: 6
,
Paul L. Williams7
Estimated H-index: 7
,
Dominic K. Albino3
Estimated H-index: 3
Strategic agents in incomplete-information environments have a conflicted relationship with uncertainty: it can keep them unpredictable to their opponents, but it must also be overcome to predict the actions of those opponents. We use a multivariate generalization of information theory to characterize the information processing behavior of strategic reasoning experts. We compare expert and novice poker players --- "sharks" and "fish" --- over 1.75 million hands of online two-player No-Limit Texa...
Published on Sep 1, 2015in Journal of Gambling Studies 2.56
Michael Laakasuo6
Estimated H-index: 6
(UH: University of Helsinki),
Jussi Palomäki6
Estimated H-index: 6
(UH: University of Helsinki),
Mikko Salmela7
Estimated H-index: 7
(UH: University of Helsinki)
Poker is a social game, where success depends on both game strategic knowledge and emotion regulation abilities. Thus, poker provides a productive environment for studying the effects of emotional and social factors on micro-economic decision making. Previous research indicates that experiencing negative emotions, such as moral anger, reduces mathematical accuracy in poker decision making. Furthermore, various social aspects of the game—such as losing against “bad players” due to “bad luck”—seem...
Marco Alberto Javarone10
Estimated H-index: 10
In many countries poker is one of the most popular card games. Although each variant of poker has its own rules, all involve the use of money to make the challenge meaningful. Nowadays, in the collective consciousness, some variants of poker are referred to as games of skill, others as gambling. A poker table can be viewed as a psychology lab, where human behavior can be observed and quantified. This work provides a preliminary analysis of the role of rationality in poker games, using a stylized...
Published on Jan 1, 2014in International Journal of Social Robotics 2.30
Min Gyu Kim35
Estimated H-index: 35
(University of Tsukuba),
Kenji Suzuki12
Estimated H-index: 12
(University of Tsukuba)
This paper describes the study of human behaviors in a poker game with the game playing humanoid robot. Betting decision and nonverbal behaviors of human players were analyzed between human–human and the human–humanoid poker game. It was found that card hand strength is related to the betting strategy and nonverbal interaction. Moreover, engagement in the poker game with the humanoid was assessed through questionnaire and by measuring the nonverbal behaviors between playtime and breaktime.
Published on Dec 1, 2012in Entertainment Computing
Min Gyu Kim35
Estimated H-index: 35
(University of Tsukuba),
Kenji Suzuki12
Estimated H-index: 12
(University of Tsukuba)
Abstract This paper presents the groundwork for developing a humanoid playmate that is capable to play a poker game with people. In order for humanoid to interact socially with people in the poker game, it is required to have the ability to interpret and infer the human nonverbal behaviors. In this paper, we first describe the development of the humanoid playmate. The card manipulation and the humanoid movements were realized to play the poker game with people in real environment. We then observ...