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Darryl A. Seale
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
46Publications
17H-index
950Citations
Publications 46
Newest
#1Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
#2Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
Last.Eyran J. Gisches (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 8
view all 4 authors...
We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary problem,” where collective decisions on when to stop the search are reached via a prespecified votin...
#1Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
#2Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
Last.Rui Yang (UC: University of California)H-Index: 1
view all 7 authors...
Within the last decade, there has been a dramatic bloom in ridesharing businesses along with the emergence of new enabling technologies. A central issue in ridesharing, which is also important in the general domain of cost-sharing in economics and computer science, is that the sharing of cost implies positive externalities and hence coordination problems for the network users. We investigate these problems experimentally in the present study. In particular, we focus on how sequential observabili...
#1Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
#2Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
Last.Amnon Rapoport (UCR: University of California, Riverside)H-Index: 48
view all 7 authors...
The Braess Paradox (BP) illustrates an important counterintuitive observation that adding links to a directed transportation network with usage externalities may raise the costs of all users. Research on the BP traditionally focuses on congestible networks. We propose and experimentally test a new and more dramatic version of the BP, where the network exhibits both congestion (negative externalities) and cost†sharing (positive externalities) characteristics. Our design also involves experiment...
#1Amnon Rapoport (UCR: University of California, Riverside)H-Index: 48
#2Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
Last.Andrew M. Colman (University of Leicester)H-Index: 31
view all 3 authors...
Axelrod’s celebrated Prisoner’s Dilemma computer tournaments, published in the early 1980s, were designed to find effective ways of acting in everyday interactions with the strategic properties of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The winner of both tournaments was tit-for-tat, a program that cooperates on the first round and then, on every subsequent round, copies the co-player’s choice from the previous round. This has been interpreted as evidence that tit-for-tat is an effective general-p...
#1Vincent Mak (University of Cambridge)H-Index: 8
#2Amnon Rapoport (UCR: University of California, Riverside)H-Index: 48
Last.Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
view all 3 authors...
In many sequential search situations, decisions are reached by groups. We examine behavior in such situations experimentally using an extension of the “secretary problem”. In our setup, group members (players) with non-aligned preferences inspect alternatives or “applicants” one at a time with no backward solicitation. A minimal information structure is assumed where players are only informed of the relative ranks of the alternatives as they inspect them sequentially. We present the equilibrium ...
#1Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
#2William E. Stein (A&M: Texas A&M University)H-Index: 16
Last.Amnon Rapoport (UCR: University of California, Riverside)H-Index: 48
view all 3 authors...
We consider a class of dynamic tournaments in which two contestants are faced with a choice between two courses of action. The first is a riskless option (“hold”) of maintaining the resources the contestant already has accumulated in her turn and ceding the initiative to her rival. The second is the bolder option (“roll”) of taking the initiative of accumulating additional resources, and thereby moving ahead of her rival, while at the same time sustaining a risk of temporary setback. We study th...
#1Amnon Rapoport (UCR: University of California, Riverside)H-Index: 48
#2William E. Stein (A&M: Texas A&M University)H-Index: 16
Last.Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
view all 5 authors...
We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing models, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other with a variable server capacity. With experience in playing the stage queueing game repeatedly, experimental results from groups of 20 subjects suppor...
#1Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
#2Steven E. Phelan (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 14
A pure-strategy, simplified poker (PSP) game is proposed, where two players draw from a small and discrete number of hands. Equilibrium strategies of the game are described and an experiment is conducted where 120 subjects played the PSP against a computer, which was programmed to play either the equilibrium solution or a fictitious play (FP) learning algorithm designed to take advantage of poor play. The results show that players did not adopt the cutoff-type strategies predicted by the equilib...
#1Amnon Rapoport (UA: University of Arizona)H-Index: 48
#2Darryl A. Seale (UNLV: University of Nevada, Las Vegas)H-Index: 17
Publisher Summary Subsequent experimental studies of the market entry game and his associates, which systematically manipulated the information structure of the game, compared behavior in the domains of gains and losses, or introduced private information and asymmetry between players, have shown that this “magic” is robust. Under a wide variety of experimental conditions, interacting players in large groups playing the market entry game with no communication among them rapidly achieve coordinati...
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