Original paper

Tournament incentive mechanisms based on fairness preference in large-scale water diversion projects

Volume: 265, Pages: 121861 - 121861
Published: Aug 1, 2020
Abstract
Large-scale water diversion project has the characteristics of linear distribution and is usually conducted simultaneously by multiple contractors. A typical principal-agent relationship exists between the project owner and each contractor involved in executing the project. Due to the asymmetry of information and the different interest goals of the owner and contractors, the contractors are likely to engage in opportunistic behavior. This can...
Paper Details
Title
Tournament incentive mechanisms based on fairness preference in large-scale water diversion projects
Published Date
Aug 1, 2020
Volume
265
Pages
121861 - 121861
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