Original paper
Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
Abstract
We study a simple auction model with interdependent values in which there are two bidders each of whom observes a binary signal and can learn rival's information at a cost, whereafter they compete in the first-price or second-price auction. We characterize a unique symmetric equilibrium strategy—learning and bidding strategies—for the two auction formats. In the first-price auction, bidders with high signal learn rival's information with higher...
Paper Details
Title
Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions
Published Date
May 1, 2020
Journal
Volume
187
Pages
105029 - 105029
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