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Aggression, Conflict, and the Formation of Intimidating Group Reputation:

Published on Jan 10, 2020in Social Psychology Quarterly1.75
· DOI :10.1177/0190272519882389
Áron Székely3
Estimated H-index: 3
(National Research Council),
Giulia Andrighetto14
Estimated H-index: 14
(MDH: Mälardalen University College)
+ 1 AuthorsLuca Tummolini12
Estimated H-index: 12
(National Research Council)
Abstract
From inmates in prison gangs to soldiers in elite units, the intimidating reputation of groups often precedes its members. While individual reputation is known to affect people’s aggressiveness, wh...
  • References (49)
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