Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game

Volume: 74, Issue: 3, Pages: 1331 - 1353
Published: Sep 24, 2019
Abstract
Many public goods cannot be provided directly by interested parties (e.g. citizens), as they entail decision-making at nested hierarchical scales: at a lower level individuals elect a representative, while at a higher scale elected delegates decide on the provision level, with some degree of scrutiny from their constituency. Furthermore, many such decisions involve uncertainty about the magnitude of the contribution that is needed for the good...
Paper Details
Title
Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game
Published Date
Sep 24, 2019
Volume
74
Issue
3
Pages
1331 - 1353
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