Ties That Bind and Grind? Investor Reactions to Politician Appointments to Corporate Boards

Volume: 47, Issue: 2, Pages: 456 - 487
Published: Aug 20, 2019
Abstract
Although the appointment of politicians to corporate boards is a highly prevalent corporate political strategy, empirical evidence remains inconclusive as to whether and how such appointments create value for firms and their shareholders. Drawing on the director role literature, we argue that politician-directors are likely to serve as valuable resource providers but are less likely to serve as guardians of shareholder interests. In light of...
Paper Details
Title
Ties That Bind and Grind? Investor Reactions to Politician Appointments to Corporate Boards
Published Date
Aug 20, 2019
Volume
47
Issue
2
Pages
456 - 487
Citation AnalysisPro
  • Scinapse’s Top 10 Citation Journals & Affiliations graph reveals the quality and authenticity of citations received by a paper.
  • Discover whether citations have been inflated due to self-citations, or if citations include institutional bias.