The Reverse Matthew Effect: Consequences of Retraction in Scientific Teams

Published on Jul 1, 2019in The Review of Economics and Statistics
· DOI :10.1162/rest_a_00780
Ginger Zhe Jin23
Estimated H-index: 23
(UMD: University of Maryland, College Park),
Benjamin F. Jones21
Estimated H-index: 21
(NU: Northwestern University)
+ 1 AuthorsBrian Uzzi34
Estimated H-index: 34
Teamwork pervades modern production, yet teamwork can make individual roles difficult to ascertain. The Matthew effect suggests that communities reward eminent team members for great outcomes at th...
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  • Citations (1)
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