Original paper
Randomization and Adaptive Learning in a Simplified Poker Game
Volume: 69, Issue: 1, Pages: 31 - 49
Published: Jan 1, 1997
Abstract
Thirty pairs of subjects participated in three different two-person zerosum Poker games in extensive form with imperfect and asymmetric information. The results provide no support for the (unique) mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players on either the individual or the aggregate level. Compared to this solution, the informed players do not bluff as often as they should, and the uninformed players call too often. Comparison of...
Paper Details
Title
Randomization and Adaptive Learning in a Simplified Poker Game
Published Date
Jan 1, 1997
Volume
69
Issue
1
Pages
31 - 49
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Notes
History