QUIT-for-TAT and the Endogenous Structure of Cooperation in Voluntary Dilemmas
Published: Jan 1, 2011
Abstract
The ability to select and reject partners creates a powerful means of supporting cooperation when a common set of actors faces repeated possibilities for playing the prisoner’s dilemmas with each other, a common situation that we refer to as a voluntary dilemma. The cooperative quit-for-tat (QFT) strategy that maintains all relationships with mutually cooperative partners but quits any relationship after a defection can maintain cooperation in...
Paper Details
Title
QUIT-for-TAT and the Endogenous Structure of Cooperation in Voluntary Dilemmas
Published Date
Jan 1, 2011
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