Public goods game with ambiguous threshold

Volume: 191, Pages: 109165 - 109165
Published: Jun 1, 2020
Abstract
Various collective action problems can be described as a discrete public goods game with a threshold. In this game, players may be reluctant to contribute to the provision of public goods when the threshold value is uncertain. We derive equilibria when players face ambiguity (i.e., Knightian uncertainty) on the threshold value by using Choquet expected utility. Furthermore, we show that in a class of neo-additive capacities, an increase in...
Paper Details
Title
Public goods game with ambiguous threshold
Published Date
Jun 1, 2020
Volume
191
Pages
109165 - 109165
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