Best Not to Know: Pay Secrecy, Employee Voluntary Turnover, and the Conditioning Effect of Distributive Justice

Volume: 64, Issue: 2, Pages: 482 - 508
Published: Apr 1, 2021
Abstract
Building on uncertainty management theory, we develop and test a model explicating how and when secrecy in pay communication may affect employee turnover-related outcomes (i.e., employee turnover intentions and firm voluntary turnover rates). Underlying this model is the notion that employees triangulate perceptions of pay secrecy (i.e., a pay-related procedural justice cue that also reflects uncertainty) with their own or others’ perceptions of...
Paper Details
Title
Best Not to Know: Pay Secrecy, Employee Voluntary Turnover, and the Conditioning Effect of Distributive Justice
Published Date
Apr 1, 2021
Volume
64
Issue
2
Pages
482 - 508
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