The electoral benefits of unemployment, clientelism and distributive politics

Volume: 129, Pages: 104908 - 104908
Published: May 1, 2020
Abstract
We show that in the month prior to the 2003 Argentine presidential election, the expenditures of an Argentine poverty relief program exhibit a partisan bias. Taking into consideration the number of potential recipients (the unemployed with children 18 years old or less), the counties that were ideologically against the incumbent received a disproportionately large amount of the spending. Hence, instead of targeting swing or core districts, as...
Paper Details
Title
The electoral benefits of unemployment, clientelism and distributive politics
Published Date
May 1, 2020
Volume
129
Pages
104908 - 104908
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