Buyer’s optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions

Volume: 283, Issue: 3, Pages: 1011 - 1025
Published: Jun 1, 2020
Abstract
We consider a procurement auction where the buying firm can manipulate the distribution of the uncertainty facing competing suppliers via reducing subjectivity in the scoring rule announced before the auction, and we examine the optimal choice of information revelation for the buyer. Specifically, we model a multi-attribute scoring auction in which the suppliers submit bids involving both price and non-price attributes and the buyer selects one...
Paper Details
Title
Buyer’s optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions
Published Date
Jun 1, 2020
Volume
283
Issue
3
Pages
1011 - 1025
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