Merger review with intermediate buyer power

Volume: 67, Pages: 102531 - 102531
Published: Dec 1, 2019
Abstract
Buyer power features prominently in antitrust cases and debates, particularly as it relates to the potential for a merger among suppliers to harm a buyer. Using a Myersonian mechanism design approach, Loertscher and Marx (2019b) provide a framework for merger review for markets with buyer power, assuming that buyer power is a zero-one variable. In the present paper, we extend this analysis by treating buyer power as a continuous variable...
Paper Details
Title
Merger review with intermediate buyer power
Published Date
Dec 1, 2019
Volume
67
Pages
102531 - 102531
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