Original paper
Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability
Abstract
In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally compare the institution of democratic punishment, where members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, with individual peer-to-peer and dictatorial punishment institutions. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions. A comparison...
Paper Details
Title
Individual, Dictator, and Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability
Published Date
Oct 1, 2019
Journal
Volume
178
Pages
104053 - 104053
Citation AnalysisPro
You’ll need to upgrade your plan to Pro
Looking to understand the true influence of a researcher’s work across journals & affiliations?
- Scinapse’s Top 10 Citation Journals & Affiliations graph reveals the quality and authenticity of citations received by a paper.
- Discover whether citations have been inflated due to self-citations, or if citations include institutional bias.
Notes
History