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References8
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Published on Jun 21, 2018
Robert E. Goodin40
Estimated H-index: 40
,
Kai Spiekermann6
Estimated H-index: 6
Democracy has many attractive features. Among them is its tendency to track the truth, at least under certain idealized assumptions. That basic result has been known since 1785, when Condorcet published his famous jury theorem. But that theorem has typically been dismissed as little more than a mathematical curiosity, with assumptions too restrictive for it to apply to the real world. In An Epistemic Theory of Democracy, Goodin and Spiekermann propose different ways of interpreting voter indepen...
Published on Sep 1, 2015in Political Science Research and Methods
S DicksonEric10
Estimated H-index: 10
(NYU: New York University),
HaferCatherine9
Estimated H-index: 9
(NYU: New York University),
LandaDimitri9
Estimated H-index: 9
(NYU: New York University)
We present a model and a laboratory experiment on the informativeness of debate, varying both informational and institutional variables. The informational variable we focus on is a novel factor affecting the extent to which audience members can learn from exposure to unpersuasive arguments. The more easily a listener can learn from an argument she finds unpersuasive, the greater the risk that the speaker will alienate this listener when she fails to persuade her. We find a strong interaction bet...
Published on Jul 1, 2012in Games and Economic Behavior 1.00
Patrick Hummel9
Estimated H-index: 9
(Yahoo!)
This paper introduces a model of electoral competition in which candidates select policies and voters are then exposed to arguments in favor of the policies. Voters update their beliefs about their own private preferences after listening to arguments and then vote in the election. I show that candidates adopt more divergent policies when voters are exposed to more arguments before the election.
Published on Apr 1, 2009in American Journal of Political Science 4.35
LandaDimitri9
Estimated H-index: 9
(NYU: New York University),
Adam Meirowitz20
Estimated H-index: 20
(Princeton University)
We contend that, with a suitably broad notion of rationality and a diverse set of motivations, the game-theoretic tradition is particularly well suited for generating insights about effects of deliberative institutions and that progress in the development of deliberative democratic theory hinges on making proper sense of the relationship between game-theoretic and normative theoretic approaches to deliberation. To advance this view, we explore the central methodological issues at the core of tha...
Published on Oct 1, 2008in The Journal of Politics 2.49
S DicksonEric10
Estimated H-index: 10
(NYU: New York University),
HaferCatherine9
Estimated H-index: 9
(NYU: New York University),
LandaDimitri9
Estimated H-index: 9
(NYU: New York University)
A theory of deliberation must provide a plausible account both of individuals? choices to speak or to listen and of how they reinterpret their own views in the aftermath of deliberation. We describe a game-theoretic laboratory experiment in which subjects with diverse interests and information choose to speak or to listen and, after updating their beliefs, vote over a common outcome. An important feature of our strategic setting is that not receiving a specific communication is sometimes just as...
Published on Jul 1, 2007in Journal of Theoretical Politics 0.92
HaferCatherine9
Estimated H-index: 9
(NYU: New York University),
LandaDimitri9
Estimated H-index: 9
(NYU: New York University)
We present a game-theoretic model of the social dynamics of belief change in which the (relevant) logically non-omniscient audience becomes convinced that the speakers' messages are `true' because its own prior beliefs logically entail them, rather than — as in cheap-talk models — because the speaker is (endogenously) trustworthy. We characterize the equilibria of the game and consider how their aggregate informational properties change with the variation in the institutions determining the ...
Lu Hong7
Estimated H-index: 7
(LUC: Loyola University Chicago),
Scott E. Page29
Estimated H-index: 29
(UM: University of Michigan)
We introduce a general framework for modeling functionally diverse problem-solving agents. In this framework, problem-solving agents possess representations of problems and algorithms that they use to locate solutions. We use this framework to establish a result relevant to group composition. We find that when selecting a problem-solving team from a diverse population of intelligent agents, a team of randomly selected agents outperforms a team comprised of the best-performing agents. This result...
Published on Jun 1, 1999in American Political Science Review 3.90
Timothy J. Feddersen18
Estimated H-index: 18
(NU: Northwestern University),
Wolfgang Pesendorfer28
Estimated H-index: 28
(Princeton University)
We analyze a model of a two-candidate election in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. Voters may costlessly choose to either vote for one of the candidates or abstain. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voter's private information. The model also provides an explanation for observed patterns of participation and partisanship.
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