Power in economic games.

Published on Jun 1, 2020in Current opinion in psychology
· DOI :10.1016/J.COPSYC.2019.07.019
Eric van Dijk45
Estimated H-index: 45
(LEI: Leiden University),
Carsten K. W. De Dreu68
Estimated H-index: 68
(LEI: Leiden University),
Jörg Gross6
Estimated H-index: 6
(LEI: Leiden University)
Economic games offer an analytic tool to examine strategic decision-making in social interactions. Here we identify four sources of power that can be captured and studied with economic games – asymmetric dependence, the possibility to reduce dependence, the ability to punish and reward, and the use of knowledge and information. We review recent studies examining these distinct forms of power, highlight that the use of economic games can benefit our understanding of the behavioral and neurobiological underpinnings of power, and illustrate how power differences within and between groups impact cooperation, exploitation, and conflict.
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