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Local Cyber-Physical Attack for Masking Line Outage and Topology Attack in Smart Grid

Published on Jul 1, 2019in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid10.486
· DOI :10.1109/TSG.2018.2865316
Hwei-Ming Chung2
Estimated H-index: 2
(SUTD: Singapore University of Technology and Design),
Wen-Tai Li9
Estimated H-index: 9
(SUTD: Singapore University of Technology and Design)
+ 3 AuthorsChao-Kai Wen22
Estimated H-index: 22
(NSYSU: National Sun Yat-sen University)
Sources
Abstract
Malicious attacks in the power system can eventually result in a large-scale cascade failure if not rectified in a timely manner. These attacks, which are traditionally classified into physical and cyber attacks , can be avoided by using the latest advanced detection mechanisms. However, a new threat called cyber-physical attacks jointly targets both the physical and cyber layers of the system to interfere with the operations of the power grid is more malicious than traditional attacks. In this paper, we propose a new cyber-physical attack strategy where the transmission line is first physically disconnected, the line-outage event is masked to mislead the control center into detecting this as an obvious line outage at a different position in the local area of the power system. Therefore, the topology information in the control center is interfered with as a result of our attack. We also propose a novel procedure for selecting vulnerable lines and analyze the observability of our proposed framework. Our proposed method can effectively and continuously deceive the control center into detecting fake line-outage positions, and thereby increase the chance of cascade failure because the attention is given to the fake outage. The simulation results validate the efficiency of our proposed attack strategy.
  • References (31)
  • Citations (7)
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References31
Newest
#1Yuzhang Lin (NU: Northeastern University)H-Index: 6
#2Ali Abur (NU: Northeastern University)H-Index: 42
Normalized Lagrange multiplier test has been shown to be very effective for network parameter error identification, but its validation has so far been solely based on extensive simulations. This paper presents a new framework by which: 1) the normalized Lagrange multiplier test is re-formulated from the perspective of hypothesis testing, enabling proper handling of missing bad parameter cases; 2) formal proofs are given for the combined utilization of normalized Lagrange multiplier test and norm...
14 CitationsSource
#1Zhiyi Li (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 17
#2Mohammad Shahidehpour (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 74
Last. Abdullah Abusorrah (KAU: King Abdulaziz University)H-Index: 19
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This paper offers the pertinent studies on the locally coordinated cyber-physical attacks that would use the incomplete network information and could cause undetectable transmission line outages. First, power line reactances in the targeted local areas are estimated and the remaining power system is modeled equivalently. Next, a mathematical model in the mixed-integer linear programming form is presented for analyzing the attacks, which would cause undetectable line outages while maximizing the ...
27 CitationsSource
#1Xuan Liu (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 16
#1Xuan Liu (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 13
Last. Zuyi Li (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 37
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It has been shown that an attacker can stealthily launch false data injection attacks against the state estimation without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power network. In this paper, we propose a heuristic yet effective method to determine a feasible attacking region of a single line, which requires less network information. We use six IEEE standard systems to validate the proposed attacking strategy. This paper can reveal the vulnerability of the real-time to...
35 CitationsSource
#1Hwei-Ming Chung (CIT: Center for Information Technology)H-Index: 2
#2Wen-Tai Li (SUTD: Singapore University of Technology and Design)H-Index: 9
Last. Chao-Kai Wen (NSYSU: National Sun Yat-sen University)H-Index: 22
view all 5 authors...
A well-designed attack in the power system can cause an initial failure and then results in large-scale cascade failure. Several works have discussed power system attack through false data injection, line-maintaining attack, and line-removing attack. However, the existing methods need to continuously attack the system for a long time, and, unfortunately, the performance cannot be guaranteed if the system states vary. To overcome this issue, we consider a new type of attack strategy called combin...
2 CitationsSource
#1Xuan Liu (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 16
#1Xuan Liu (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 13
Last. Zuyi Li (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 37
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Power systems are being exposed to cyber-attacks due to the high integration of information technology and the vulnerability of communication networks. Existing false data attacks research focus on dc state estimation. In this paper, we show that an attacker can construct an undetectable attack vector against ac state estimation based on a few measurements in the attacking region associated with boundary buses without knowing the full topology and parameter information of the entire power networ...
73 CitationsSource
#1Gaoqi Liang (University of Newcastle)H-Index: 9
#2Junhua Zhao (CUHK: The Chinese University of Hong Kong)H-Index: 33
Last. Zhao Yang Dong (EPRI: Electric Power Research Institute)H-Index: 61
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With rapid advances in sensor, computer, and communication networks, modern power systems have become complicated cyber-physical systems. Assessing and enhancing cyber-physical system security is, therefore, of utmost importance for the future electricity grid. In a successful false data injection attack (FDIA), an attacker compromises measurements from grid sensors in such a way that undetected errors are introduced into estimates of state variables such as bus voltage angles and magnitudes. In...
204 CitationsSource
#1Ruilong Deng (U of A: University of Alberta)H-Index: 20
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Last. Hao Liang (U of A: University of Alberta)H-Index: 23
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Smart grid, as one of the most critical infrastructures, is vulnerable to a wide variety of cyber and/or physical attacks. Recently, a new category of threats to smart grid, named coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs), are emerging. A key feature of CCPAs is to leverage cyber attacks to mask physical attacks which can cause power outages and potentially trigger cascading failures. In this paper, we investigate CCPAs in smart grid and show that an adversary can carefully synthesize a false d...
48 CitationsSource
#1Ying Sun (SUTD: Singapore University of Technology and Design)H-Index: 2
#2Wen-Tai Li (SUTD: Singapore University of Technology and Design)H-Index: 9
Last. Chau Yuen (SUTD: Singapore University of Technology and Design)H-Index: 49
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This paper stands an attacker's point of view to develop a novel attack strategy that causes as much destructive as possible to the topology of electric network. By attacking transmission lines, power flow of girds will be changed, which could cause overload on other lines and possibly trigger cascading failures, and then lead to large areas blackout. Meanwhile, considering the limited resource of attacker, we propose a method to find out the minimum value to corrupt the measurements of attacked...
2 CitationsSource
#1Zhiyi Li (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 17
#2Mohammad Shahidehpour (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 74
Last. Abdullah Abusorrah (KAU: King Abdulaziz University)H-Index: 19
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This paper analyzes a coordinated cyber–physical attack on power systems, which could lead to undetectable line outages. Coordinated with physical attacks that cause line outages, the two-step cyberattacks comprising topology preserving and load redistribution attacks could mask and potentially exasperate outages to trigger cascading failures. These coordinated cyber–physical attacks are analyzed in a proposed bilevel model, which aims at identifying the most damaging and undetectable physical a...
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#1Xuan Liu (IIT: Illinois Institute of Technology)H-Index: 16
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Today’s power systems become more prone to cyber-attacks due to the high integration of information technologies. In this paper, we demonstrate that the outages of some lines can be masked by injecting false data into a set of measurements. The success of the topology attack can be guaranteed by making that: 1) the injected false data obeys Kirchhoff current law and Kirchhoff voltage law to avoid being detected by the bad data detection program in the state estimation and 2) the residual in the ...
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This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on N-1reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Prior work has shown that FDI attacks can be designed via an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) to cause physical overflows after re-dispatch using DCOPF. In this paper, it is shown that attacks designed using DCOPF...
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Transmission system is one of the most important assets in secure power delivery. Recent advancements toward automation of smart grids and application of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have increased vulnerability of power grids to cyberattacks. Cyberattacks on transmission network, specifically the power transmission lines, are among crucial emerging challenges for the operators. If not identified properly and in a timely fashion, they can cause cascading failures lead...
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Demand-side resources (DSRs) have been shown to be valuable for providing reserve capacity and enhancing the reliability of power systems with high wind power penetration. The successful utilization of DSRs relies heavily upon the infrastructure of advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs). Notably, ICT systems may suffer from cyber attacks and communication latency, which could result in the malfunctions of DSRs and consequently bring adverse impacts on the reliability of power...
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Cyber attacks on transmission lines are one of the main challenges in security of smart grids. These targeted attacks, if not detected, might cause cascading problems in power systems. This paper proposes a bi-level mixed integer linear programming (MILP) optimization model for false data injection on targeted buses in a power system to overflow targeted transmission lines. The upper level optimization problem outputs the optimized false data injections on targeted load buses to overflow a targe...
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