Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games

Volume: 9, Issue: 1
Published: Jun 3, 2019
Abstract
Mechanisms and conditions for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation in multi-player social dilemma games remain an open question. This paper focuses on stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games with different exclusion strategies. We introduce four strategy types in the population, namely, cooperation, defection, loner and exclusion. Synchronous and asynchronous exclusion forms have been compared in finite-sized, well-mixed and...
Paper Details
Title
Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games
Published Date
Jun 3, 2019
Volume
9
Issue
1
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