Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core

Published: Jan 6, 2023
Abstract
In the one-sided assignment game, any two agents can form a trade; they can decide to form a partnership and agree on how to share the surplus created. Contrary to the two-sided assignment game, stable outcomes often fail to exist in the one-sided assignment game. Hence the core, which coincides with the set of stable payoffs, may be empty. We introduce the idea of tradewise-stable (t-stable) outcomes: they are individually rational outcomes...
Paper Details
Title
Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
Published Date
Jan 6, 2023
Citation AnalysisPro
  • Scinapse’s Top 10 Citation Journals & Affiliations graph reveals the quality and authenticity of citations received by a paper.
  • Discover whether citations have been inflated due to self-citations, or if citations include institutional bias.