Voting Rules in Sequential Search by Committees: Theory and Experiments

Volume: 65, Issue: 9, Pages: 4349 - 4364
Published: Sep 1, 2019
Abstract
We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary problem,” where collective decisions on when to stop the search are reached via a prespecified voting rule. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of our model and then report two experiments on three-person committees with either uncorrelated or perfectly correlated preferences under three different voting rules followed by a third experiment on single...
Paper Details
Title
Voting Rules in Sequential Search by Committees: Theory and Experiments
Published Date
Sep 1, 2019
Volume
65
Issue
9
Pages
4349 - 4364
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