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Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach

Published on Mar 1, 2019in Games and Economic Behavior1.00
· DOI :10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.003
Timothy N. Cason35
Estimated H-index: 35
(Purdue University),
Vai-Lam Mui13
Estimated H-index: 13
(Monash University)
Abstract
We study experimentally the indefinitely repeated noisy prisoner’s dilemma, in which random events can change an intended action to its opposite. We investigate whether groups choose Always Defect less and use lenient or forgiving strategies more than individuals,and how decision-makers experiment with different strategies by letting them choose from an extensive list of repeated game strategies. We find that groups use forgiving and tit-for-tat strategies more than individuals. Always Defect, however, is the most popular strategy for both groups and individuals. Groups and individuals cooperate at similar rates overall, and they seldom experiment with different strategies in later supergames. Classification-JEL C73, C92
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  • Citations (3)
References54
Newest
#1Matthew Embrey (University of Sussex)H-Index: 4
#2Mengel Friederike (University of Essex)H-Index: 14
Last.Ronald Peeters (University of Otago)H-Index: 27
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#1Caleb A. Cox (VCU: Virginia Commonwealth University)H-Index: 5
#2Brock Stoddard (ASU: Appalachian State University)H-Index: 5
#1Heike Auerswald (TUD: Dresden University of Technology)H-Index: 3
#2Carsten Schmidt (UMA: University of Mannheim)H-Index: 13
Last.Gaute Torsvik (University of Oslo)H-Index: 11
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#1Matthew Embrey (University of Sussex)H-Index: 4
#2Guillaume R. Frechette (NYU: New York University)H-Index: 22
Last.Sevgi Yuksel (UCSB: University of California, Santa Barbara)H-Index: 3
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Cited By3
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