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Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma

Published on Jan 4, 2019in Regulation & Governance 2.79
· DOI :10.1111/rego.12234
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
,
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl3
Estimated H-index: 3
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
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Abstract
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits they can create (or the trouble they can cause) give them leverage. Conversely, tight governor control constrains intermediaries. The governor thus faces a dilemma: emphasizing control limits intermediary competence and risks policy failure; emphasizing intermediary competence risks control failure. This “governor's dilemma” helps to explain puzzling features of indirect governance: why it is not limited to principal–agent delegation but takes multiple forms; why governors choose forms that appear counterproductive in an informational perspective; and why arrangements are frequently unstable.
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Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute),
Markus Jachtenfuchs7
Estimated H-index: 7
The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU’s shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar functional demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spill-over) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero-sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coercive and administrative capacities, an...
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Alec Stone26
Estimated H-index: 26
(NUS: National University of Singapore),
Eric Palmer1
Estimated H-index: 1
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Orfeo Fioretos8
Estimated H-index: 8
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Andreas Kruck1
Estimated H-index: 1
This article analyzes the empowerment and disempowerment of credit rating agencies (CRAs) as private regulatory intermediaries. Until the recent financial crisis, regulators heavily relied on private credit ratings to impose risk-sensitive requirements on financial market actors (targets). Regulatory use of credit ratings was instrumental in empowering CRAs because regulatory authority was delegated to them and their own private power was bolstered by public endorsement. But regulators’ subseque...
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Walter C. Ladwig6
Estimated H-index: 6
('KCL': King's College London)
Published on Oct 1, 2016in British Journal of Political Science 4.29
Kenneth W. Abbott26
Estimated H-index: 26
(ASU: Arizona State University),
Philipp Genschel17
Estimated H-index: 17
(EUI: European University Institute)
+ 1 AuthorsBernhard Zangl14
Estimated H-index: 14
(LMU: Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegation is premised on hard ‘contractual’ control over ...
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Henning Tamm1
Estimated H-index: 1
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Estimated H-index: 10
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Estimated H-index: 5
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Estimated H-index: 23
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Colin Crouch31
Estimated H-index: 31
(MPG: Max Planck Society)
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