A ‘threat’ is a ‘Threat’: Incentive effects of firing threats with varying degrees of performance information

Published: Feb 1, 2018
Abstract
We study the incentive effect of firing threats when bosses have limited information about workers. We show that a minimal amount of individual information about workers’ effort such as the time spent at their work station is sufficient to ensure strong incentive effects. This supports the use of firing threats based on rudimentary yet uncontroversial measures of work performance such as absenteeism, in organizational settings in which only...
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Title
A ‘threat’ is a ‘Threat’: Incentive effects of firing threats with varying degrees of performance information
Published Date
Feb 1, 2018
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