Moderating Effects of Agency Problems and Monitoring Systems on the Relationship between Executive Stock Option and Audit Fees: Evidence from Korea
Abstract
Since executive stock options may give rent-seeking incentives to CEOs, CEOs with stock options are likely to misallocate corporate resources to seek personal gains, which in turn may lead to a decrease in firm value. High-quality audit services can reduce the negative impacts of executive stock options on firm value and help firms to ensure sustainable growth. However, while most of the existing accounting literature related to executive stock...
Paper Details
Title
Moderating Effects of Agency Problems and Monitoring Systems on the Relationship between Executive Stock Option and Audit Fees: Evidence from Korea
Published Date
Nov 4, 2018
Journal
Volume
10
Issue
11
Pages
4041 - 4041
Citation AnalysisPro
You’ll need to upgrade your plan to Pro
Looking to understand the true influence of a researcher’s work across journals & affiliations?
- Scinapse’s Top 10 Citation Journals & Affiliations graph reveals the quality and authenticity of citations received by a paper.
- Discover whether citations have been inflated due to self-citations, or if citations include institutional bias.
Notes
History