Under the radar: How firms manage competitive uncertainty by appointing friends of other chief executive officers to their boards
Abstract
Research Summary In this study, we reveal a previously unstudied type of board tie that may help firms manage competitive uncertainty. While firms face regulatory barriers to the use of board interlock ties as a strategy for reducing competition, we suggest that firms can circumvent these barriers by appointing the friends of competitors' chief executive officers (CEOs) to their boards. Our theoretical framework addresses the antecedents,...
Paper Details
Title
Under the radar: How firms manage competitive uncertainty by appointing friends of other chief executive officers to their boards
Published Date
Oct 23, 2018
Journal
Volume
40
Issue
1
Pages
79 - 107
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