The Role of Shareholder Agreements in Mitigating Superprincipal Agency Conflicts Among Family Firms

Volume: 2018, Issue: 1, Pages: 18818
Published: Jul 9, 2018
Abstract
Governance research paints a bleak picture regarding the organizational consequences of shareholder agreements (SAs). These legally binding contracts contain management and ownership provisions wherein participating shareholders agree to collude in a pre-determined manner. Research shows that SAs concentrate shareholders’ power and entrench shareholders, thereby aggravating principal-principal agency conflicts and hurting firm performance. In...
Paper Details
Title
The Role of Shareholder Agreements in Mitigating Superprincipal Agency Conflicts Among Family Firms
Published Date
Jul 9, 2018
Volume
2018
Issue
1
Pages
18818
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