Managerial Reliance on the Retail Shareholder Vote: Evidence from Proxy Delivery Methods

Volume: 66, Issue: 4, Pages: 1717 - 1736
Published: Apr 1, 2020
Abstract
Recent studies document the increasing effectiveness of shareholder voting as a monitoring mechanism. Because both directors and the market respond to shareholder votes, management has stronger incentives to influence voting outcomes. We identify one channel through which management can affect voting outcomes: increasing the turnout of (typically management-friendly) retail shareholders. Our study focuses on an observable managerial choice of...
Paper Details
Title
Managerial Reliance on the Retail Shareholder Vote: Evidence from Proxy Delivery Methods
Published Date
Apr 1, 2020
Volume
66
Issue
4
Pages
1717 - 1736
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