Home Alone: The Effects of Lone‐Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance
Abstract
Research summary: Corporate scandals of the previous decade have heightened attention on board independence. Indeed, boards at many large firms are now so independent that the CEO is “home alone” as the lone inside member. We build upon “pro‐insider” research within agency theory to explain how the growing trend toward lone‐insider boards affects key outcomes and how external governance forces constrain their impact. We find evidence among...
Paper Details
Title
Home Alone: The Effects of Lone‐Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance
Published Date
May 31, 2017
Journal
Volume
38
Issue
13
Pages
2623 - 2646
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