Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States

Volume: 93, Issue: 2, Pages: 179 - 208
Published: Mar 28, 2017
Abstract
Moral hazard in natural disaster insurance markets results in policyholders preparing less, increasing the risk they face. However, moral hazard may not arise, due to high risk aversion or market context. We study the relationship between disaster risk reduction and insurance coverage to assess the presence of moral hazard for two different natural hazards, using four econometric models on survey data from Germany and the United States. The...
Paper Details
Title
Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States
Published Date
Mar 28, 2017
Volume
93
Issue
2
Pages
179 - 208
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