The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games

Volume: 48, Issue: 4, Pages: 815 - 835
Published: Feb 23, 2017
Abstract
It is well documented that people are reluctant to switch from a default option. We experimentally test the robustness of this behavioral inertia in a collective decision-making setting by varying the default option type and the decision-making environment. We examine the impacts of automatic-participation and no-participation default options on subjects’ participation in a public goods provision and their contributions. Two variants of public...
Paper Details
Title
The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games
Published Date
Feb 23, 2017
Volume
48
Issue
4
Pages
815 - 835
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