Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Published: Jan 1, 2015
Abstract
More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience, as suggested by backward induction, remains inconclusive. This paper provides a meta-analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game. We describe forces that affect initial play...
Paper Details
Title
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Published Date
Jan 1, 2015
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