Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
Abstract
We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does observed behavior approach the perfect equilibrium as players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which possess some of the robust properties of learning noted in the psychology literature. The intermediate term predictions of these models track well...
Paper Details
Title
Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
Published Date
Jan 1, 1995
Journal
Volume
8
Issue
1
Pages
164 - 212
Citation AnalysisPro
You’ll need to upgrade your plan to Pro
Looking to understand the true influence of a researcher’s work across journals & affiliations?
- Scinapse’s Top 10 Citation Journals & Affiliations graph reveals the quality and authenticity of citations received by a paper.
- Discover whether citations have been inflated due to self-citations, or if citations include institutional bias.
Notes
History