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Coordinating Resistance Through Communication and Repeated Interaction

Published on Feb 1, 2014in The Economic Journal
· DOI :10.1111/ECOJ.12088
Timothy N. Cason36
Estimated H-index: 36
(Purdue University),
Vai-Lam Mui13
Estimated H-index: 13
(Monash University)
Abstract
Successful deterrence of leader expropriation is important for economic development. This article studies experimentally how repeated interactions and communication can help deter leaders from extracting surplus from their subordinates. We show that repetition alone is far from sufficient in deterring leader expropriation. Communication between subordinates is critical for increasing coordinated resistance even when the information communicated is highly restrictive. Adding communication reduces expropriation significantly even in the presence of repetition.
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