Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off

Published: Jan 1, 2009
Abstract
The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those which are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a...
Paper Details
Title
Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off
Published Date
Jan 1, 2009
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