Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players

Volume: 39, Issue: 1, Pages: 111 - 136
Published: Apr 1, 2002
Abstract
We study a class of large-group, noncooperative, iterated market entry games with complete information, binary choices, and asymmetric players in which the incentive of each player to enter the market decreases the larger the number of entrants. Experimental results from two different studies show remarkable coordination on the aggregate level, which is accounted for successfully by the Nash equilibrium solution. The equilibrium solution is less...
Paper Details
Title
Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players
Published Date
Apr 1, 2002
Volume
39
Issue
1
Pages
111 - 136
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