Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World

Published: Dec 9, 2010
Abstract
We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs...
Paper Details
Title
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
Published Date
Dec 9, 2010
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