Deliberation as Self-Discovery and Institutions for Political Speech
Abstract
We present a game-theoretic model of the social dynamics of belief change in which the (relevant) logically non-omniscient audience becomes convinced that the speakers' messages are `true' because its own prior beliefs logically entail them, rather than — as in cheap-talk models — because the speaker is (endogenously) trustworthy. We characterize the equilibria of the game and consider how their aggregate informational properties change with the...
Paper Details
Title
Deliberation as Self-Discovery and Institutions for Political Speech
Published Date
Jul 1, 2007
Volume
19
Issue
3
Pages
329 - 360
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