Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication
Abstract
null null In this paper, we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication, which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game. We find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem. Specifically, behavior null never null converged to the efficient outcome when subjects...
Paper Details
Title
Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication
Published Date
Jul 1, 1993
Journal
Volume
5
Issue
3
Pages
485 - 504
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