Propositional reasoning by mental models? Simple to refute in principle and in practice.
Abstract
Two experiments compared the predictions of mental-models theory with a mental-logic theory. Results show that people do not make fallacious inferences predicted by mental-models theory but not predicted by mental-logic theory and that people routinely make many valid inferences predicted by mental-logic theory that should be too difficult on mental-models theory. Thus, the mental-logic theory accounts better for the data. A difference between...
Paper Details
Title
Propositional reasoning by mental models? Simple to refute in principle and in practice.
Published Date
Jan 1, 1994
Journal
Volume
101
Issue
4
Pages
711 - 724
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