Individual strategies in a market entry game
Abstract
Quantitatively trained Ph.D. students participated in three replications of a 20-trial market entry game in which each agent has two pure strategies—to “enter the market” or “stay out of the market”—and the individual payoff depends on the size of the set of active agents entering the market. With experience, subjects adhered more strictly to pure strategies, which although markedly different from one to the other combined to form distributions...
Paper Details
Title
Individual strategies in a market entry game
Published Date
Mar 1, 1995
Volume
4
Issue
2
Pages
117 - 133
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