Investor Horizon and CEO Horizon Incentives
Abstract
We examine the relation between shareholder investment horizon and CEO horizon incentives derived from compensation contracts. We find that influential incumbent shareholders provide managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these shareholders plan to sell their stock. Specifically, we use the IPO setting in which venture capitalists represent short-horizon, controlling investors with strong selling incentives...
Paper Details
Title
Investor Horizon and CEO Horizon Incentives
Published Date
Jan 1, 2009
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