Tax authorities' interaction with taxpayers: A conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust

Volume: 37, Pages: 13 - 23
Published: Feb 1, 2015
Abstract
Tax compliance represents a social dilemma in which the short-term self-interest to minimize tax payments is at odds with the collective long-term interest to provide sufficient tax funds for public goods. According to the Slippery Slope Framework, the social dilemma can be solved and tax compliance can be guaranteed by power of tax authorities and trust in tax authorities. The framework, however, remains silent on the dynamics between power and...
Paper Details
Title
Tax authorities' interaction with taxpayers: A conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust
Published Date
Feb 1, 2015
Volume
37
Pages
13 - 23
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