Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia

Volume: 104, Issue: 7, Pages: 2210 - 2237
Published: Jul 1, 2014
Abstract
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable...
Paper Details
Title
Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
Published Date
Jul 1, 2014
Volume
104
Issue
7
Pages
2210 - 2237
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