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Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital

Volume: 50, Issue: 5, Pages: 1461 - 1489
Published: Dec 1, 1995
Abstract
This paper examines the structure of staged venture capital investments when agency and monitoring costs exist. Expected agency costs increase as assets become less tangible, growth options increase, and asset specificity rises. Data from a random sample of 794 venture capital‐backed firms support the predictions. Venture capitalists concentrate investments in early stage and high technology companies where informational asymmetries are highest....
Paper Details
Title
Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital
Published Date
Dec 1, 1995
Volume
50
Issue
5
Pages
1461 - 1489
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