The Hidden Costs of Control

Volume: 96, Issue: 5, Pages: 1611 - 1630
Published: Nov 1, 2006
Abstract
We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principal-agent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their performance as a response to the principal's controlling decision. Overall, the effect of control on the principal's payoff is...
Paper Details
Title
The Hidden Costs of Control
Published Date
Nov 1, 2006
Volume
96
Issue
5
Pages
1611 - 1630
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