Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders' Share Collateral with Taiwan Evidence

Volume: 10, Issue: 02, Pages: 173 - 191
Published: Jun 1, 2007
Abstract
Controlling shareholders' share collateral is a new source of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights leading to minority shareholder expropriation. However, controlling shareholders' share collateral is not forbidden and has not received particular restriction leading to its popularity in the capital markets. Neglecting the potential agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders' share collateral would hurt the interests of...
Paper Details
Title
Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders' Share Collateral with Taiwan Evidence
Published Date
Jun 1, 2007
Volume
10
Issue
02
Pages
173 - 191
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