When Doves Conspire: Evolution of Nondamaging Fighting Tactics in a Nonrandom-Encounter Animal Conflict Model
Abstract
Models of evolution of animal fighting strategies generally assume that contestants encounter each other perfectly randomly with respect to strategy type. I modified two game-theory models of J. Maynard Smith, G. R. Price, and G. A. Parker to include any amount of encounter nonrandomness. Analysis of my models demonstrates that assortative encounters (in which like encounters like with greater than chance probability) favor evolution of pure...
Paper Details
Title
When Doves Conspire: Evolution of Nondamaging Fighting Tactics in a Nonrandom-Encounter Animal Conflict Model
Published Date
Jun 1, 1980
Journal
Volume
115
Issue
6
Pages
858 - 869
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