Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda

Volume: 30, Issue: 1, Pages: 64 - 82
Published: Jan 1, 2000
Abstract
null null The first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues (the agenda) matters even if players become arbitrarily patient. This result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues. It is found that simultaneous bargaining over “packages” should be a prevailing phenomenon, but we also...
Paper Details
Title
Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda
Published Date
Jan 1, 2000
Volume
30
Issue
1
Pages
64 - 82
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